55 YEARS AND COUNTING

STORIES OF COMMUNITY STRUGGLE FOR A BINDING ADB SAFEGUARDS
55 years and counting: 
Stories of community struggle for a binding ADB safeguards 
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INSIDE

About the Photobook

Words from the Executive Director

Central Asia

Rural Area Water Supply and Sanitation Sector
Education Sector Reform
Dushanbe-Kyrgyz Border Road Rehabilitation
Road Network Development East-West Highway Improvement Project
Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Project
Road Network Development Program
Community-Based Infrastructure Services Sector Project
CAREC Transport Corridor 1
North-South Road Corridor Investment Program
Amu Bukhara Irrigation System Rehabilitation Project
Ulaanbaatar Green Affordable Housing and Resilient Urban Renewal Sector Project

South Asia

Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project
Khulna-Jessore Drainage Rehabilitation
Kali Gandaki "A" Hydroelectric Project
Sundarbans Biodiversity Conservation
Southern Transport Development Project
Southwest Areas Integrated Water Resources Management
Phulbari Coal Project
West Seti Hydroelectric Project
Mundra Ultra Mega Power Project
Melamchi Water Supply Project
Accelerating Infrastructure Investment Facility

Mahaweli Water Security Investment Program
Kolkata Environmental Improvement Investment Program
Tanahu Hydropower Project
Wind Power Generation Project
Northern Province Sustainable Fisheries Development Project (PDA)
Bengaluru Metro Rail Project
Greater Malé Waste-to-Energy Project

Southeast Asia

Marcopper Mining Disaster
Mae Moh Power Station
Calaca Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant Project
Industrial Tree Plantation Project
Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project
Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management
Electricity Market and Transmission Development
Tonle Sap Environmental Management
GMS Nam Thuen 2 Hydroelectric Project
Reconstruction of Cement Production Facility in Aceh Project
Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City Highway Project
GMS Rehabilitation of the Railway in Cambodia
GMS: East-West Economic Corridor
Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program
Masinloc Coal-Fired Power Plant
Song Bung 4 Hydropower Project
Visayas Base-Load Power Project
Promoting Economic Use of Customary Land
Solid Waste Management Sector Project: Technical Assistance

Acknowledgement
Safeguards policies were rolled out by Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) emerged as a direct response to community resistance. For decades, development projects have caused havoc to communities, livelihoods, and the environment. When the World Bank adopted Safeguards Policies in the 1980s, this was celebrated as a paradigm shift. Later, more and more multilateral development banks, including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), started adopting and operationalizing them across the project cycle.

The ADB adopted its first amalgamated policy in 2009, combining three different policies in one. Despite that, social and environmental havoc caused directly and indirectly by development projects continued to persist and is now on the rise. This photo book is a visual representation of this social and environmental havoc across time and space. The rapid urbanization and development trends are shaping people’s lives in an unprecedented manner. This photo book documents the negative impacts of these trends and covers violations from 2003, which superseded The Safeguards Policy Statement (SPS) 2009. We chose to cover this period to illustrate the stark similarities between the violations and human rights abuse endured by communities then and now. This photo book serves as a visual representation of the violations, sub-standards, and disconnect between the ADB Policy and the realities on the ground. It is a visual representation of the simultaneously evolving yet static dynamic between communities, multilateral development banks, and safeguards. But more importantly, it is an ode to the endurance and perseverance of communities across Asia-Pacific who continue to resist the structures of power and the violations of rights and policies.

We hope that by documenting these struggles, we personify them to move beyond labels such as ‘project-affect peoples,’ which essentialize communities in the Global South and alienate the Bank from the havoc they sanction. Through a series of real stories and impactful photographs, this book depicts a sense of anger and despair arising from the unpredictable nature of the resettlement, the effects on livelihood, and the evolving deterioration of human rights and environmental standards. We invite you to take part in this anger and despair and walk in the community’s localized tracks and struggles. We hope that by the end, 55 Years and Counting: Stories of community struggle for a binding ADB safeguard unveils why we need a just, robust, and rights-based policy and why we are fighting for it.

About the Photobook

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Words from the Executive Director

This photobook comes at a time when the Asian Development Bank is amidst reviewing its Safeguards Policy Statement 2009. NGO Forum on ADB and its network of civil society groups have advocated for binding environmental and social safeguards at ADB for decades, which are currently at threat of dilution. The development finance system in Asia is leaning towards flexibility for investment by both multilateral development banks as well as the private sector. This comes as no surprise as the last two years of battling the pandemic has left borrowing governments exhausted and desperate. Yet, in the search for recovery funds and new investments, they should not undermine the immediate threat that infrastructure projects entail to local communities and the environment. Through this photobook, we intend to illuminate our readers on the historical track record of ADB’s poor implementation in safeguards delivery across its projects. For each particular project, the photographs and the testimonies are all contributed by first-hand local civil society groups who have stood side by side with local communities across the wider Asia Pacific. They have witnessed the pitfalls and identified the lack of meaningful consultation, and dearth of project information as the fundamental problem in ADB Safeguards design and delivery. We hope this compilation will serve as a reminder for the ADB not to repeat the same mistakes that it has done across the projects described here. I want to thank each and every single civil society organization that has worked tirelessly to make this photobook possible, and we continue to recognize the risk entailed, and the courage demonstrated at the local level by our members and allies in bringing these stories from the ground to your attention.

Nadeen Madkour
Safeguards Policy Specialist
NGO Forum on ADB

Rayyan Hassan
Executive Director
NGO Forum on ADB
The Rural Area Water Supply and Sanitation Sector, funded by the ADB, listed ‘environmentally sustainable growth’ as its strategic agenda, but it has violated Kazakh laws in the course of the project implementation.

The Center for Introduction of New Environmentally Friendly Technologies Public Fund (CINEFT), a Forum network, has monitored the ADB-funded water project in Kazakhstan. One of the challenges they have encountered is accessing project-related information from state bodies.

There are 900 settlements in South Kazakhstan region, and only 363 of them were provided access to drinking water: eight cities, 10 towns, and 345 villages (only 40.3%). In some districts, only 39% have access to drinking water supply. Some people had been exposed to a risk of infections and poisoning due to muddy water.

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In addition, the South Kazakhstan Public Prosecutor’s (PP) office found that there were violations of national laws, there were 15 settlements involved in the water project, the State Commission accepted 12 water supply units, but three of them were still unused: there was money spent, but the people do not have access to drinking water.

In another examination made by South Kazakhstan PP office and the State Sanitary and Epidemiologic Institution, they found many cases of violations of the state building, architectural and sanitary standards. The pipeline used in the construction was corroded and has not functioned at all.

The PP office brought a suit against the State Commission of the Committee for Water Resources of the Ministry of Agriculture. The court came out with a decision to cancel it on 24 January 2006.

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The Education Sector Reform Project (ESRP), funded by the ADB, was a loan extended to the education sector of Tajikistan. The project period was from 30 June 2003 to 06 January 2010, with the source of funding coming from the Asian Development Fund (US$7.50 million), Japan Special Fund (US$ 300,000.00), and Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (US$ 2.00 million).

In the course of the project, the ADB proudly stated that the project has had ‘a direct positive impact on Tajikistan’s poverty reduction strategy by improving equitable access to and completion of better quality primary and general secondary education and improved gender balance; in school participation in the five pilot districts.’ However, on the ground, the project was fraught with issues.

The complainants raised concerns about the lack of access to project information, the unwillingness of the implementing agency and ADB to release important information, and the substandard quality of work done in participating schools. By 29 July 2010, a collective move was made by several NGOs based in Tajikistan; they filed a complaint with the Office of Special Project Facilitator (OSPF), raising concerns about the sub-standard quality of rehabilitation works. OSPF received the complaint on 05 August 2010, and by August 2011, the complaint was found to be eligible for the Consultation Phase. The following month, a review and assessment of the complaint took place.

The newly installed blackboard in one of the classrooms was already broken after days of being used—one of the proofs of the substandard quality of work in the project.
Books have several versions with the same content. On page 17, floors in one of the schools are already broken a few months after the renovation.
The Dushanbe-Kyrgyz Border Road Rehabilitation Project affected three cities (Dushanbe, Vahdat, Rogun), five rayon centers of town level, and six administration units amounting to USD 1M for 150,000 people.

The people coming from Rasht rayon: communities of Garm, Yaldimich, Belgi, Yangolik, Djafr, and Tajikabad: communities of Karasagir, Mazorishing, Mullokendja, Kapali still have to be resettled.

The ADB has violated its Involuntary Resettlement (IR) policy of 1995, which requires that the safeguard principle be upheld in preparing and implementing projects funded by the Bank. They have also failed to ensure that displaced people receive assistance, preferably under the scheme, so they will be at least as well off as they would have been in the absence of the project.

In addition, the Tajikistan Land Code (article 48) states that if the land is taken from a physical and juridical or legal person for state and public needs, those persons will be apportioned the exact value of land and losses, including income which will be fully compensated. But this is not what is happening on the ground; people are being left homeless.

Also, the evaluation of costs has been done without discussions with affected people; impacted communities did not receive any copies of the budget in figures (assessment of their properties).
One of the houses that is impacted by the Dushanbe-Kyrgyz Border Road Rehabilitation Project. This page | The house will have to be relocated elsewhere because it is situated in the area where the road is going to be constructed.

The area where the Dushanbe-Kyrgyz Border Road Rehabilitation Project will be implemented.
Road Network Development
East-West Highway Improvement Project

This page | A part of the Azerbaijan East-West Highway Improvement Project.
On page 24 | The stretch of the road network affecting 702,300 people living in the six districts.
The ADB funded Azerbaijan: East-West Highway Improvement Project, which aimed to facilitate socio-economic development by improving the east-west highway and local roads closely linking the western part of Azerbaijan to Baku. Source of funding includes Ordinary Capital Resources (USD 49.00M), Asian Development Fund (USD 3.00M), Islamic Development Bank (USD 10.40 M), and Saudi Fund for Development (USD 11.00 M).

Despite the project’s goal of regional cooperation, the project impacted 702,300 people living in the six districts affected by the construction of the road network. Even plot areas, houses, and other spaces along the highway are affected.
The Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Project funded by the ADB intends to improve the water supply system, sewerage, and sanitation facilities in 16 towns or about 125 villages in Armenia. The ADB projected that it would bring improvement in public health and the environment for 576,000 people.

The State Commission on Water Systems implemented the $36-million loan project includes rehabilitation and replacing the deteriorated water supply infrastructure by reducing leakage, improving water supply pressure, and constructing new main pipes for new consumers, mainly poorly served low-income communities. However, the poor project design has resulted in pipes breakdowns and inadequate water supply quality.

There is also the exclusion of selected findings from the project monitoring report, which led to the exclusion of several Landjazat residents from the project and left them without a connection to the main water pipe.

The Armenian Women for Health and Healthy Environment (AWHHE) monitored the project in several villages. With its intervention and role as mediator (facilitator), the group helped monitor the quality of the water supply and identify water leakages.

With the successful intervention and facilitation by AWHHE in the project implementation stage, the ADB improved the project design. Around 100 households have been connected to the main pipe.
AZERBAIJAN

Road Network Development Program

2007
The Masalli–Astara Motorway Construction Project, funded by the ADB and World Bank, has caused many problems for the communities affected by the project. There was no publicly available information regarding the road design, maps, resettlement plan, and draft design and monitoring framework.

A more controversial issue was raised when executive authorities asked families to sign a document without any explanation and full knowledge that some individuals were illiterate.

Several landowners have refused to sign the document because they do not agree with the amount of compensation stated in the paper. It became clear that local executive authorities started to receive affected people's consent to give land for road construction without making any agreements and legalizing land acquisition.

Over 126 families would be affected by the construction of the expressway, affecting 21 hectares of agricultural land.

On page 31 | The stretch of Masalli–Astara Motorway has impacted 11 settlements namely Khil, Sarchuvar, Boradigyah, Mollaoba, Turkoba, Yeiddiymag II villages (Masally Rayon); Bolodi, Girdani, Liman, Urga, Shirinsu villages (Lenkaran Rayon).

This page | A finished part of the Road Network Development Program.

There are people who have no legal entitlements for their land and property. The IR Policy of 1995 requires that the absence of formal legal title to land by some affected groups should not be a bar to compensation.
Poor water infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan from the Soviet era led international donors to support investments in agricultural irrigation and potable freshwater systems.

As a solution, the Kyrgyz government asked the ADB for a loan amounting to US$36 M in 2001. The Community-Based Infrastructure Services Sector Project was supposed to finish by 2007 but it did not.

Taza Tabigat, the Forum member that assisted the impacted communities stated that there was use of expensive yet inappropriate or poor-quality construction materials. What is worst is that there are asbestos pipes used in the construction process despite being prohibited.

The use of poor construction materials was also noted to be linked to environmental health problems; one case involved the discovery of worms in water pipes in the village of Uch-Emchek.

There is also the issue of corruption and fraud investigations related to the first project phase, the Public Prosecutor’s Office instigated 31 criminal cases, with five companies under investigation at the time of writing.

During the implementation of the project there was no water and the affected communities have to collect rain water for their daily use.
The ADB also conducted an independent investigation process, finding that fraud had occurred in the provision of supposedly new water pipes. As a result of these investigations, the ADB decided to close the first phase of the project pending a fuller government inquiry and prosecution of those responsible.

December 2012, Prime Minister Satymbaiev noted individuals liable for misuse of these financial resources would be held to account, although no prosecutions had been finalized.
The Kyrgyz Republic: CAREC Transport Corridor 1 (Bishkek–Torugart Road) funded by the ADB is a US$300 million road rehabilitation project.

By November 2009, at least 30 villagers along with NGOs, the Taraz Press Club Public Union, filed a complaint to the OSPF. The complaint raised issues on information dissemination, absence of community participation, inclusion of cattle passes on the project design, an underpass for agricultural machinery, and fair compensation.

The NGO “Bugu-Marat” identified several people affected by the project. They have requested for compensation for lost shops, destroyed trees, and relocation costs restoring.
The stretch of CAREC Transport Corridor 1 will cost approximately US$300 million.
Approved in September 2007, the $30.6 M North-South Road Corridor Investment Program, which intends to rehabilitate the much-dilapidated 222.8 km Soviet-era, had caused problems to impacted communities. Civil society organizations, together with affected communities, stated that there was no public consultation emphasizing that local communities were not involved in the discussion of the project. Impacted communities also pointed out the possibility of flooding in the area and the possibility of cars crashing into residential plots because of the poor project design.

Communities sent a letter to the ADB inquiring about the lack of public participation and poor project design. In response, the ADB management expressed intention to resolve the problem by reviewing and revising (if necessary) the project design to ensure that flooding, which the project may cause, will be avoided, revision of design with the agreement by residents, the inclusion of safety barriers to prevent cars from crashing into residential plots in the revised plan and establishment of safety nets for the government.
Amu Bukhara Irrigation System Rehabilitation Project

The Amu Bukhara Irrigation System Rehabilitation (ABIS) was a project funded by the ADB in Uzbekistan from 15 Nov 2011 to 31 Aug 2020. The source of funding includes Ordinary Capital Resources (US$ 174.00 M), Asian Development Fund (US$ 46.00 M) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (US$ 100.00 M).

The project aims to rehabilitate and upgrade prioritized components of the main irrigation system, to help the government raise agricultural productivity and rural incomes but what the ADB failed to put into account is that the Uzbek government uses a cotton production system that relies on forced labor and forced child labor.

In addition, the tightly controlled, highly-centralized structure of the cotton sector in Uzbekistan undermines the incomes of rural farmers. The system traps farmers in poverty, and the state profits from high-priced sales to global buyers.

In 2012, the Uzbek government forced over a million of its own citizens, children and adults to harvest cotton in abusive conditions on threat of punishment. Regional authorities, police, and school administrators, reporting to the prime minister and other cabinet ministers, transported children and adults by bus to the country’s cotton fields, where those far from their homes were assigned temporary housing.

The workers picked cotton for weeks at a time and were not free to leave. Child and young adult workers missed school and college. Adults and older children were required to harvest a minimum of 60 kilograms (or 132 pounds) per day, with younger children required to meet slightly lower quotas.

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There is also the issue of authorities regularly threatens, imprison, and torture rights defenders and civil society activists, and block international rights groups and media outlets from operating in Uzbekistan. There was no civic participation and meaningful stakeholder consultation.

Despite longstanding and well-documented concerns about forced labor and child labor in the cotton harvest in Uzbekistan, Uzbek authorities have steadfastly refused to allow international monitors unfettered access to inspect working conditions in the cotton sector, and arrested and intimidated local activists and independent journalists who have attempted to report on forced labor.
Cotton picking is dangerous work. Each year, the forced-labor system of cotton production has claimed the lives of several Uzbek citizens, and many forced to pick cotton, including children, are exposed to unknown chemicals in the fields, unsanitary housing, and lack of safe drinking water.

In 2015 and 2016, the government of Uzbekistan forced more than a million people, including students, teachers, doctors, nurses, and employees of government agencies and private businesses to the cotton fields, against their will and under threat of penalty, especially losing their jobs.
Adults and older children were required to harvest a minimum of 60 kilograms (or 132 pounds) per day, with younger children required to meet slightly lower quotas.
Local residents have also been complaining because some parts of the construction site are trespassing into peoples’ property. Families who were denied resettlement are now struggling to live, with a road blocking their doorsteps and construction rigs above their heads.

Some families are being forced to flee without any compensation and assistance. Key concerns raised by all complainants is lack of safety and security for all but especially for children.
In late November 2020, impacted communities in the Ger district of Ulaanbaatar filed two complaints to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), against the Ulaanbaatar Urban Services and Ger Areas Development Investment Program - Tranche 1 and 2.

In the complaints, affected families stated that the road project violated ADB’s social and environmental standards and caused numerous problems, related to inadequate land acquisition, compensation and resettlement plans; property damage; and poor road construction safety standards.

Initially, the impacted families resettled outside the town were promised 500 sqm of land, but now they are being offered 250 sqm, half of what was promised. Aside from that, they are only provided with a land possession title for five years instead of having their ownership title restored, which is something that is granted to each Mongolian citizen for free. One cannot build a home and livelihood on land with a 5 year permit.

The resettlement plan is also threatening the Mongolian traditional way of living as a “khot ail,” where several generations of families customarily live together and share herding tasks. Instead of giving a land certificate and compensation to each family that is part of the khot ail, ADB issued a land certificate and granted compensation to only one family.

The resettlement sites are located far away from people’s original homes and business places, so their livelihoods are threatened. The Livelihood Restoration Program, which was put in place after complaints were filed in March 2018, is not proving to be effective and is barely covering those identified as poor, but not all economically displaced as a result of the resettlement.
SOUTH ASIA
Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project

PAKISTAN

1991
The Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (CRBIP) Phase III is part of an extensive irrigation system in the desert area of Pakistan. While the ADB claimed the project would bring water to the desert, communities feared that the project would destroy indigenous irrigation technology, cause massive displacement, and disturb natural water cycles for a significant expense and minimal gain.

The project involves the construction of a 274-km canal along the Indus River, 72 distribution canals, 68 cross structures, and 91 bridges. Initiated in 1992, CRBIP III was due for completion in end-December 2002, though construction is still ongoing in part due to recommendations by the ADB’s Inspection Panel. It says that it will irrigate 666,000 acres of land in both D.I. Khan and D.G. Khan districts in central Pakistan.

February 2001, affected communities, with the assistance of CSOs, have raised their concerns not only with relevant government officials in Pakistan but also with the ADB. The project and its negative impact were also highlighted during the 2001 and 2002 Annual Meetings of the Bank.
Khulna-Jessore Drainage Rehabilitation

1993
The Khulna-Jessore Drainage Rehabilitation Project is a US$ 33.92M project by the ADB that affected 274 villages of 17 unions under Khulna, Jessore and Satkhira districts of Bangladesh.

The principal objective of the Khulna-Jessore Drainage Rehabilitation Project was to reduce poverty to below 60% by increasing agricultural production and creating on-farm employment in the project area. However, it was not implemented properly, impacted communities have stated that there was absence of public consultations and unwillingness to accept traditional approach of water management has resulted in submersion of many settlements, including government buildings and schools. Millions of people especially poor and landless farmers, sharecroppers, agricultural wage laborers, petty traders and others lost their livelihoods security.

By 2000 to 2004 impacted communities experienced an unprecedented severe flood during the rainy season that worsened the situation of the water logging and human suffering. Communities have lost their paddy fields, homesteads, and livelihoods. They were forced to sell their lands and they had to move onto embankments and roadside.
NEPAL

Kali Gandaki “A” Hydroelectric Project

1996
In 1997, Kali Gandaki Hydroelectric Project A began constructing a dam over the Kali Gandaki river. The dam was built by the Italian company Impregilo S.p.a. The project is worth an estimated US$420 million and was financed by the ADB, the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the Finnish Development Agency (FINNIDA).

The project is located in the Western Development Region of Nepal. The project’s main component is situated in Syangja District in Gandaki Zone, and other parts partially encompass other districts such as Gulmi, Palpa, Parbat, Kaski, and Rupandehi.

Communities and CSOs immediately protested the severe environmental and social impacts of the project. In May 2015, the residents of Basari village in Nepal informed officials about a nearby landslide that damaged five houses. The District Administration and police officers arrived and took stock of the situation. The nearby cracked surfaces served as a reminder of the devastating Gorkha earthquake the previous month.

More than 250 villagers were relocated to a safe spot. More landslides ensued the following day. While sleeping in the temporary camp, the residents of Basari village experienced another shock.

This time an even more colossal landslide formed a wall of mud and rock that blocked the Kali Gandaki River.

People panicked, fearing for their lives, local police made announcements on loudspeakers asking people in Mustang, Myagdi, Baglung, Parbat, Gulmi, Syangja, Tanahun, and Nawalparasi districts downstream to remain on high alert.

The landslide dammed the river and blocked almost the entire flow, which resulted in a 2-km long artificial backwater lake. A nearby ridge had also developed cracks after the earthquake. The landslide buried 27 houses.
On page 71 | An aerial view of the Kali Gandaki Hydroelectric Project A funded by the ADB.

On page 72 | Houses built by ADB for displaced Bote community with no toilet, no water supply, no electricity, and not sufficient for whole family.

On page 73 | Erosion and landslide in Kali Gandaki A Reservoir.

This page | Records shows that the river was blocked several times in the past, due to landslides.
Sundarbans Biodiversity Conservation

BANGLADESH

1998
The largest-ever biodiversity project undertaken by Bangladesh Government (GoB) is the Sundarbans Biodiversity Conservation Project (SBCP). The SBCP was implemented from 1999 to 2006, but it was suspended in September 2003 due to project design, activities implementation, and financial management problems.

It was formally and unilaterally canceled by the ADB in early 2005, blaming the Forest Department (FD) for failing to take steps to revise the project.

While the FD is partly to blame for the project’s failure, other parties should also be held accountable. The US$ 77.5 M project was intended to establish a proper management system to maintain the biological integrity of the Sundarbans forest through poverty alleviation.

The framework conceived for biodiversity conservation and poverty reduction was not a symbiotic ecosystem approach, where biodiversity-rich habitats like the Sundarbans cannot alienate the human-animal-forest interdependence, which is most distinctly important with local communities and indigenous people. Therefore, the project is flawed. Its primary effort is to alienate this interdependence by creating artificial, alien, and short-term resource and livelihood systems for the local communities and indigenous people in ‘poverty reduction’ and distance them from this ecosystem.

Consequently, the project failed to address the ADB and GEF policies’ forest, environment, biodiversity, and local communities’ rights issues. The project’s documents did not address how the proposed ‘participatory forest management and people’s involvement (following ADB and GEF policies would be achieved within a national institutional and legal framework).
The Southern Transport Development Project (STDP), funded by the ADB and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), is a construction of a 128-km controlled-access expressway from Colombo to the southern city of Galle, which links with an existing coastal road in Matara.

The construction of the road was supposed to catalyze economic growth in the southern region of Sri Lanka in general and reduce traffic and accidents on the coastal road, but it ended up destroying over 1,300 houses, way beyond the consultants’ estimate of a maximum of 622 houses.
The Road Development Authority (RDA) has also put the road through highly productive paddy and home gardens rather than unused lands. Residents say that the RDA Officers do this so that they can sell or use the timber and the materials from the destroyed houses. Villagers say that the RDA is misleading the government.

The government stated that the people were unaware of the compensation package and that if they knew, they would give up their lands and homes. The villagers have been cheated and harassed by the RDA and do not want to cooperate. As a result, the ADB insists that their guidelines for minimum house destruction be included in their contract with the government, but the RDA did not follow the same guidelines.

There was also the issue in 1992 of RDA filling the paddy fields from the southern end without conducting an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA); this was later stopped and abandoned due to the pressure from environmental groups to comply with the law. The same situation occurred in 1994 when the newly elected regime laid six foundation stones along the trace identified by the RDA through aerial photographs, again with no EIA. This was again abandoned due to pressure to produce an EIA under the local regulations.

This page | The project has resulted to a lot of problems including increased number of people to be resettled, harsh resettlement practices, lack of participation, lack of information and transparency, environmental degradation, and disturbance to social networks and structures.

On page 87 | Hundreds of people from 12 villages are angry with the way the RDA had thrown aside the original project plans as a result of alleged influence by the past Government in making road avoid the land of Government ministers and friends.
The Southwest Areas Integrated Water Resources Management, funded by the ADB, has 511 projects constructed to control floods and build drainage and/or irrigation. However, the management performance of these projects fell short of expectations. The poor operation and maintenance of the systems appear to be the primary cause of the schemes malfunctioning. Most Flood Control and Drainage/Irrigation (FCD/I) projects were built by top-down management that neglected the poor.

The planning, design, and implementation of Flood Control and Drainage (FCD) systems have been mainly carried out by Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) with little involvement from water management stakeholders. Similarly, from the designing phase to the implementation phase in every step of ADB-funded projects, people’s consultations were not done correctly, the local river management system, biodiversity was not appropriately considered, and the cause of the disaster was not analyzed accordingly.

The project document claims that the project proponents have studied people’s perceptions regarding their aspirations, well-being, and risks. However, in reality, an apparent lack of information among local stakeholders, particularly those who would have to contribute to the project.

The construction, operation, and maintenance of sluice gates and regulators initially had several committees but after the implementation of the project there was no one responsible for looking after the infrastructure.
Phulbari Coal Project

BANGLADESH

2007
The Phulbari Coal Project would be an open-pit coal mine in Bangladesh proposed by Asia Energy Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of London-headquartered GCM Resources, a company with coal interests in Bangladesh, South Africa, China, as well as uranium interests in West Africa, Sweden, and Australia.

Fierce resistance by the local population halted the plans for the project in 2007, and in 2010 a WikiLeaks cable revealed U.S. diplomats were secretly pushing the Bangladeshi government to re-open plans for the mine since Asia Energy has 60 percent U.S. investment.

The project would be an open-pit coal mine in Northwest Bangladesh and the construction of at least one 500-MW power plant. According to the ADB EIA, at total production, about eight million tons of coal will be transported by rail and barges to an offshore reloading facility located in Akram Point. An additional four million tons will be exported to India via railway, and the remaining three million tons will be used for domestic energy consumption.

Asia Energy/GCM estimates that the project would involuntarily resettle 40,000 people. However, activists say the number of people evicted is likely to be 10 times more, as the mine and associated infrastructure will use up 10,000 hectares of primarily fertile agricultural land.

The project would also divert a river for the needed water, pumping out 800 million liters daily and lowering the groundwater by over 500 square kilometers. Asia Energy plans to create a massive lake after the project is over, but there are concerns that the water would be toxic.

According to the group Cultural Survival, a government-sponsored study estimates that the mine would immediately displace 150,000 people in more than 100 villages, and another 100,000 would gradually be forced to leave as their wells and irrigation canals run dry from the mining. Independent researchers and the Jatiya Adivasi Parishad (National Indigenous Union) estimate that 50,000 Indigenous people belonging to 23 different tribal groups would be displaced or impoverished by the mine.

**No documents or information available about this project on the ADB website.**
On page 91 | On August 26, 2006, more than 50,000 people protested against the proposed mine in Phulbari town. People from adjoining towns and villages poured in.

On page 92 | A commotion occurred when the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), a paramilitary force, opened fire on the protesters. Three young men died instantly, and over a hundred people are reported to have been injured in the violence unleashed by the BDR and police.

This page | People from all walks of life went out to join the protest against a possible destructive project, the Phulbari Coal Power Plant.
NEPAL

West Seti Hydroelectric Project

For 16 years, the proposed West Seti Dam threatened the region’s diverse natural resources and the communities that depend on them.

In June 2011, the Government of Nepal decided to build the 750-MW West Seti Hydropower project funded by the ADB. An estimated 2,322 hectares of land would have been acquired for the project and 678 hectares for the transmission line.

This includes large expanses of cultivated land, forest, grassland, and shrubland—all crucial ecosystems for native flora and fauna and the communities that depend on them. The dam would prevent migratory fish species from reaching upstream spawning grounds, forcing them to disappear from the upper Seti River and cutting off critical upstream fisheries.

The project displaced about 1,575 households, while 13,000 people would be impacted. 7,870 will be resettled outside the project area, and 1,200 will be relocated locally. Most of the people threatened with relocation belong to the lower Hindu caste system and depend heavily on the region’s natural resources and rich biodiversity.

A report carried out in 2007 found several violations in the project’s resettlement program, inadequate information disclosure, and deception of the people’s consent.

In 2010 a campaign by Kathmandu-based Water and Energy Users’ Federation-Nepal (WAFED) forced the ADB to pull out from the project for its failure to comply.

The government stalled the project in 2007 and eventually canceled the project in 2011.
On page 97 | A community meeting about the West Seti Dam. Most of the affected people expressed their concerns and disagreements concerning the project resulting in a letter being sent to then ADB President Haruhiko Kuroda asking the ADB to reconsider its involvement.

This page | People threatened with relocation belong to the lower Hindu caste system and depend heavily on the region’s natural resources and rich biodiversity.

On page 99 | An aerial view of West Seti, northwestern Nepal. This region is rich in biodiversity and remains one of the least developed regions of the country.
Mundra Ultra Mega Power Project

*** Photos courtesy of Joe Athialy
The construction and operation of the 4,150 MW coal-fired Tata Mundra Ultra Mega Power Plant funded by the ADB have fundamentally altered the landscape and threatened the livelihoods, health, and way of life of local communities that live near the Kutch coastline. For generations, the coastline has supported communities that depend upon its nature.

The area also has mangroves, intertidal mudflats, creeks and estuaries, and grasslands. Each of the ecosystems in this region is deeply connected with the fishing, salt panning, agriculture, and grazing-related livelihoods of the people living here. The Plant takes in enormous quantities of seawater for cooling purposes, then discharges the hot wastewater back into the sea. The thermal pollution has already substantially changed the local marine ecosystem and led to a drastic decline in local fishing communities fish catch.

The construction of the Plant’s massive outfall and intake channels has also resulted in the physical and economic displacement of local fishing communities and has contributed to saltwater intrusion into the groundwater, destroying vital sources of drinking water and water used for irrigation in an area where freshwater is scarce.

A nine-mile-long coal conveyor belt, which transports coal from the port to the Plant, runs right next to local villages and near fishing grounds. Coal dust from the conveyor and fly ash from the plant frequently contaminate agriculture, fish laid out to dry, homes and property, and threatens human health. Some air pollutants are already present at levels dangerous to human health, violate Indian air quality standards, and cause respiratory problems, especially among children and the elderly.

On page 101 | The villages nearest to the project site are cattle rearing communities (gauchar) and fishing communities that lost their livelihoods and access to livelihoods.

On page 102 | The project area is on the coastal plain of the Gulf of Kutch which also has mangroves, intertidal mudflats, creeks and estuaries and grasslands. Each of the ecosystems in this region is deeply connected with the fishing, salt panning, agriculture and grazing-related livelihoods of the people living here.

This page | A child inspects if fly ashes coming from the power plant affect the dried fish that her family will sell in the market.

On page 106 | Waste disposal in sea by Tata Mundra means danger to marine life. Mangroves and certain aquatic species would be affected.
Melamchi Water Supply Project

The Melamchi Water Supply Project (MWSP) is ADB’s pet project in Sindhupalchowk District, Nepal. The project’s cost is estimated to be around $464 million. Envisioned by the ADB and its co-financiers to solve the chronic water shortage in Kathmandu Valley, the project aims to improve Melamchi Valley’s health and water supply.

A pre-condition of the ADB to fund the project is the Nepal Water Supply Corporation (NWSC).

The inter-basin river project will divert 170 million liters of water per day from the Melamchi River to Kathmandu through a 26.5-kilometer tunnel. ADB’s loan is US$120 million of the initial project cost amounting to US$444 million. The cost later escalated to US$531 million in 2005.

In 2002, World Bank withdrew from MWSP, citing the following reasons: 1) Essential options have not been explored to utilize the water resources within the valley 2) The need to fix the distribution system first and the 3) MWSP would only benefit the wealthiest five percent of the population.

In 2004, the ADB’s Special Project Facilitator (SPF) received a complaint from the Water and Energy User’s Federation-Nepal (WAFED) and three other affected individuals regarding MWSP’s non-compliance in the following areas: access to information, environmental impact assessment, land acquisition, compensation...
and resettlement, the rights of indigenous people, the social uplift program, and agriculture and forestry.

After its investigation, the SPF concluded that there was no evidence of severe or systematic non-compliance with ADB policies in design and implementation. In effect, the report also dismissed the complaint saying it was filed not so much to resolve the complainants’ charges but to question MWSP’s compliance with ADB policies and reopen the debate on changing the process of project consultation and participation.

In 2005, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) left the project, citing their dissatisfaction with the progress of the project and the ADB and concerns about Nepal’s unstable political situation following the February Royal Palace coup. After the political turnover in 2006, Norway revised its funding support to Nepal except for the MWSP.

In July 2006, Melamchi’s work in the Sindhupalchowk district was suspended for several days after locals padlocked half a dozen offices of the project after officials failed to meet their demands for employment. The ADB has announced that it will continue funding the project despite “minor hurdles in the construction process.”

There is also the issue of lack of public participation and consultation and the lack of transparency and the democratic process involved in the implementation of the road survey, land acquisition, compensation, resettlement, and the Social Upliftment Program (SUP). Locals, including the ethnic Tamang communities, want the SUP to be thoroughly discussed, designed, and implemented with their full consent.

The project is not environmentally sound; the tunnel’s construction between the mountain will cause irreparable loss to the surrounding environment. The prescribed release of 0.4 cubic meters per second of water in the river after diversion is insufficient to sustain Melamchi Valley’s present and future water demand. It is not yet clear whether there is any budget for comprehensive environmental mitigation plans.

A potential major conflict over water rights among affected communities also looms ahead. People in the Melamchi Valley are also demanding a share of the profits in a levy for their freely supplied water to Kathmandu.

On a larger scale, the MWSP has unwittingly promoted social injustice. While the project will benefit only 10 percent of the country’s population, the burden of debt will be shouldered by all Nepalis. More than 70 percent of the country’s tenth five-year budget on water and sanitation has been solely allocated to the MWSP.

In 2021, the Melamchi flooding because of a sudden bursting of the river blocked by landslides triggered by incessant rainfall caused significant damage to the Melamchi Water Supply Project. The monsoon mayhem left behind a trail of devastation in Melamchi Municipality and nearby areas of Sindhupalchok district.

As floodwaters started gushing into settlements, hundreds of families were displaced in the Melamchi Bazar area, where the mud brought by the floodwaters buried homes as high as first the first floor.
The Accelerating Infrastructure Investment Facility in Himachal Pradesh was approved on October 21, 2013. The project was implemented through ADB’s contractor Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services (IL&FS).

The project’s goal was to alleviate poverty and provide an important infrastructure link between people and markets. Instead, the project has caused major problems to more than one hundred affected workers, leaving them with months of unpaid back wages and other legal benefits.

As of February 2019, the project owes the affected workers a total of 22 million Indian rupees.

The project has resulted in other labour violations, including:
1. No employment contracts
2. Forced overtime without pay
3. Forced weekend work
4. No social security coverage for the workers and their families
5. Violation of the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining
6. No specific facilities for women workers
7. Gross negligence on occupational health and safety (OHS) and first-aid facilities

The project has also violated rules laid out in the ADB Social Protection Strategy, which guarantees compliance with core labor standards and minimum legal protections.

The Social Protection Strategy also requires all ADB-funded projects to have a ground-level grievance mechanism, however, this project never had such a mechanism.

A complaint was also filed to the ADB Accountability Mechanism Office of the Special Project Facilitator last May 30, 2019, by the affected workers regarding this project.
The ongoing construction of the Kiratpur Ner Chowk Expressway

On page 117 | Workers tunneling the expressway despite the absence of employment contracts.
On page 118 | Workers mobilizing, stating that IL&FS has violated labor laws and has deprived them of right to freedom of association and collective bargaining.

This page | Construction of the Kiratpur Ner Chowk Expressway
The US$243 billion Upper Elahera Canal Project, which is currently in operation to carry water to the northern part of Sri Lanka, is being implemented with the financial assistance of the Asian Development Bank under the Mahaweli Water Security Investment Program.

This project is funded under the Water Resources Development Investment Program of ADB. Although the project is seen as a solution to the water shortage in the northern part of the country, the damage caused to the environment by the project is enormous.

At present about 30,000 trees are being removed from the Elahara Reserve and millions of endemic plants are being destroyed in parallel. The project also threatens the survival of wildlife, especially wild elephants.
The destruction caused by massive deforestation in the Elahera forest reserve due to the Upper Elahera Canal development project in the region.

On page 124 | The location of a tunnel opening in the ADB funded Upper Elahera Canal project.
The Kolkata Environmental Improvement Investment Project (KEIIP) was supposed to improve water supply and sanitation access. But more than 300 small shopkeepers are displaced due to the pending construction to facilitate the sewerage and drainage line along with the Mahatma Gandhi Road.

With delayed construction schedules because of COVID-19, most have not been able to resume their businesses, and those few who mustered the courage to reopen after a year have now been asked to bring down their tea stalls and electric shops yet again.

Those along the line live in dread about when work will commence and when they will be evicted. Meaningful consultations and information sharing before construction works are also not being done, and the vendors are left entirely in the dark on what happens next.

In addition, the Entitlement Matrix was still not explained nor shared as a leaflet to the affected persons (APs).

Rightful compensation due to these street vendors and support amid this crisis must be given; their forced displacement is on ADB. KEIIP is Category B, both on the environment and involuntary resettlement.
On page 127 | On going construction of the KEIP at the Mahatma Gandhi road.

On page 131 | Children are not able to play because of the debris and construction materials in the site.

This page | Waterlogging in Motilal Gupta road caused by the project.
Tanahu Hydropower Project

NEPAL

2017
In western Nepal, indigenous Magar families impacted by the Tanahu Hydropower Project have been protesting against the project and calling for "land for land" and "house for house" compensation, as well as a re-survey of land missed during the project’s "Detailed Measurement Survey" and free, prior, and informed consent throughout the project process.

Tanahu Hydropower Limited, wholly owned by the Nepal Electricity Authority, is developing the 140-MW Tanahu Hydropower Project. On the Seti river in Tanahu District, the Project will build a concrete dam with a reservoir that is roughly 25 kilometers long and 140 meters high. The infrastructure connected with the Project are being built by the SinoHydro Corporation. The Project has received support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Investment Bank (EIB), and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

The impacted households lodged their concerns with the ADB and EIB’s accountability procedures in 2020, asking for an ongoing impartial mediation process to address their issues with the Project.
ADB funded a wind power project at Mannar with a capacity of 100 MW implemented by the Ceylon Electricity Board of Sri Lanka. The location of the wind power project is vulnerable as the migrant birds arrive in Sri Lanka via routes that are blocked by the windmills. Upon giving comments to the EIA report by CEI, ADB agreed to set up a radar system that would detect bird movements and shut down the windmills. However, we think the windmills are not suitable for being set up at this location as it still interferes with the wind patterns.
On page 137 | A dead bird in the location of Mannar Wind Power Project.

On page 138 | A flock of flamingos in the surrounding area. These migrant birds can be seen in the migrating season as large flocks.

This page | The established Mannar wind power project’s windmills along the seashore in the Mannar Island.
Northern Province Sustainable Fisheries Development Project (PDA)

This page | Over 400 community members participating in the community-led research process to identify shared goals and priorities.

On page 144 | Fisherfolks from the district of Jaffna.
Earlier this year, the ADB withdrew its financial support for the Northern Province Sustainable Fisheries Development Project in Sri Lanka, effectively halting a years-long community-led effort to make funders accountable to community priorities.

The project had a stated aim to revive the fisheries sector in the districts of Jaffna, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Kilinochchi through the rebuilding of large-scale infrastructures such as harbors, anchorages, and associated facilities.

After learning about the project through civil society groups, community members began to mobilize to seek more information and engage more meaningfully with project planners and funders. Up until that point, communities had not been consulted on the project and had scant information. The little information that was available was not available in Tamil, the language spoken by most in the communities. Technical project designs had already been conducted but lacked the crucial input of communities. Without meaningful community participation, how could the project move ahead?

A complaint to the ADB’s Accountability Mechanism was submitted by the Pesalai Fishermen Co-op Society on behalf of communities in Pesalai, a fishing village on the island of Mannar in May 2018. The complaint outlined the community’s grave concerns about the large-scale nature of a proposed harbor and its adverse impacts on livelihoods, the risk of environmental pollution, and grave social risks, including potential reignition of conflict if there was a large influx of people from the south. Young people of Pesalai raised their concerns about the future of their land that could be destroyed by the large-scale project. Furthermore, the Bishop of Mannar district held a large community meeting to discuss the project and wrote a letter calling on the government to respect the feelings of the people.

The communities in the Northern Province with their strong solidarity and partnership with civil society were able to make their voices heard. They took extraordinary action at an early stage to intervene in a process imposed upon them and which excluded their participation. Unfortunately, rather than engage meaningfully with community demands, the project has now been dropped without any explanation to those affected or the public at large.

The communities’ intentions were never to stop the project but to request transparency and accountability and to offer their expertise in the design and implementation of the project to serve the people’s needs. Their wishes and demands have not been met. The adverse impacts of the project may have been averted now that the project has been dropped but the needs of the local fishing communities remain unmet.

* Information and photos was from International Accountability Project, Accountability Counsel and Sri Lanka Nature Group.
Bengaluru Metro Rail Project
In the ADB project datasheet, the Bengaluru Metro Rail Project will support the Government of India in expanding the metro railway network in Bengaluru City by financing two new metro corridors totaling 56 kilometers (km) in length. However, the supposed beneficiary of the project is disappointed because it was approved amidst a raging pandemic.

The Bengaluru Metro Rail Project 2A and 2B Airport lines were conceived, presented, and heavily supported in the pre-pandemic era. And hence all the traffic demand analysis, modeling, and forecasting are from when government restrictions and company policies bound work-from-home (WFH) in IT capital Bangalore. In addition, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry is likely to take a call on permanent work-from-home arrangement for IT SEZs by the end of May 2021. The industry is seeking clarity on the SEZ rules and related tax procedures to implement a long-term blended work model with remote working as a critical component, mainly due to the second COVID-19 wave in the country.

Impacted communities are asking to:

- Maintain the Bengaluru Metro project status quo for Phase 2 A & 2 B until the pandemic subsides.
- Prepare a fresh DPR by appointing competent, independent experts.
- Conduct a new Comprehensive Traffic Assessment vis-a-vis the current policy of IT companies to encourage WFH.

On page 147 | This tree stump belongs to Tree number 500 and has perhaps stood here for 40+ years and could tell many stories. Along with 4500+ trees, it has also merely become a statistic of the trees felled for the shiny new Airport Metro Line financed by ADB. The city once hailed as the Garden City has lost much of its tree cover.

On page 148 | The Airport Metro Line extending from Silk Board to BIAL is a 58.19 Kms. The citizens have been extremely distressed at the loss of commons (parks, lakes, avenue trees) and have peacefully protested to highlight that citizens participation is part of democracy and public consultations must be a part of the process.

This page | Many tree lined avenues such as this one today stand bare and just a line of stumps that will soon be removed to make way for the Metro Construction.
In the Maldives, the proposed WtE facility that the ADB has funded is located in Thilafushi, an industrial island roughly 8km from the city center of Malé, one of the most densely populated cities in the world.

The government of Maldives, along with ADB, has proposed to build a 500 tonnes per day WtE facility under a 15-year design, build and operate contract. The WtE component is required to generate 8MW of electricity. The total project cost of 151.13 Million US Dollars with funding from the ADB, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Japan Fund for the Joint Crediting Mechanism (IFCM), and the Government of Maldives (GoM). Through the Design Build and Operate (DBO) contract, the operator will guarantee a minimum feedstock of 500 tonnes of waste per day. Details remain undisclosed as the Environment Ministry of the Maldives refuses to disclose any necessary information about the projects despite multiple requests.

It is essential to highlight that the financial feasibility of this project is not publicly available. The Environment Ministry has refused to disclose the details though there is a lot of public interest to find out if this project is financially feasible or not.

As highlighted, one of the main concerns is the government’s commitment to waste to wealth. However, the project has been formulated in a DBO contract format. Where a foreign incinerator operator would design, build and operate the facility. This means that the income from operations and the majority of the wages being paid to the workers will be leaving the Maldives. As the spare parts are also not available in the Maldives, most of the procurement will be foreign purchases.
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The project had a stated aim to revive the fisheries sector in the districts of Jaffna, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Kilinochchi through the rebuilding of large-scale infrastructures such as harbors, anchorages, and associated facilities.

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Marcopper Mining Disaster

1964
24 March 1996, Marcopper had an accidental release of tailings into the environment from the mine. The concrete plug in the tunnel (from the Tapian Pit to the Makulapnit River) located at the base of the tailings pit burst, and the rock enveloping this plug was fractured, triggering the escape of about 1.6 million cubic meters of mine tailings at the rate of five to ten cubic meters per second. Said volume of mine tailings was equivalent to more than three million tons of hazardous waste.

Before this accident, the Tapian Pit was used for tailings storage of the company’s adjacent San Antonio Mine, as the Tapian copper ore body was depleted in 1992. With a surface area of 60 hectares, the open pit disgorged 220 million tons of earth and rocks, from which one million tons of copper metal were mined from 1969 to 1991.

The tailings spillage rendered the 27-kilometer Boac River and its twin Makulapnit River biologically dead and further silted the coastal and estuarine areas near the Boac River delta. At the height of the disaster, five villages had to be evacuated, and an estimated 20,000 people in the 42 villages along the two rivers and the estuary were affected.

The food security of 12 fishing villages around the bay has been severely impacted for more than 25 years. These tailings are also leaching metals into the bay and are suspected to be the cause of lead contamination that has been identified in children from villages around the bay.

In addition, Calancan Bay villagers were never consulted that the bay would be the dumpsite for the millions of tons of mine tailings by Placer Dome's operations. As a result, the villagers were not compensated for the devastating effects on their lives and livelihoods. For 16 long years, the Calancan Bay villagers and environmental advocates continue to press for justice.

Calancan Bay villagers were never asked for their permission for this dumping, they were never compensated for their losses, and they protested the dumping vehemently for 16 years.

Placer Dome Inc., a Canadian multinational mining company, owned nearly 40% of the total shareholding and was the largest single investor, although the Philippine Government controlled 49%, and the rest were public shares.

***No documents or information available about this project on the ADB website.
During the spill, Placer Dome had announced that it planned to clean up the river by dumping the tailings into the sea via submerged pipes, a disposal method known as Submarine Tailings Disposal, which is enormously controversial internationally and effectively prohibited by law in the US and Canada.

Water samples in the area revealed dangerous contamination levels above the tolerable human level of 0.5 microgram per 1/1000 liters of water. In 1996, the Department of Health (DOH) stated that residents might already be harboring quantities of zinc and copper beyond tolerable limits. Some residents were found to have zinc in their blood more than 200% above safe levels.
THAILAND

Mae Moh Power Station

1972
The Mae Moh Coal Power Station is located in the mountains of Lampang province in northern Thailand. The ADB has been involved in the Mae Moh mine for financing several units. The ADB has had a series of loans amounting to more than US$352 million for the past twenty years.

According to the ADB and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), its sponsor, it aims to answer the growing electricity demand in Metropolitan Bangkok and other rural areas. However, the project has negative social and environmental impacts.

The Mae Moh power plant contributes approximately more than four million tons of carbon dioxide emissions to the atmosphere annually. In addition, around 1.6 million tons of sulfur gas are released from the power plant into the air every day. This has caused severe health problems for the people near the site and has led to the deterioration of the environment. More than 200 people have died due to respiratory diseases and lung cancer since the Mae Moh power plant was operated.

The fly ash has also affected the crops of the villagers. Vegetables and fruits died because of the coal power plant’s toxicity. A nearby small pineapple plantation wilted over the years. Farmlands have also been negatively affected by acid rain, attributed to the sulfuric dioxide released by the coal power plant. In October 1992, when EGAT operated the 11 units at Mae Moh, people residing within the seven-kilometer radius of the plant fell ill with breathing difficulties, nausea, dizziness, and inflammation of the eyes and nasal cavities. After two months of operation, 50 percent of the rice fields were damaged by acid rain, and around 42,000 people were found to have breathing ailments.

In April and May 1996, six people in Mae Moh died of blood poisoning. Greenpeace further said that in 1999, more than 600 people suffered from respiratory problems caused by sulfur dioxide emissions. (Saksit Meesukkwang, 2006).

In October 2003, the State Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning Office found high levels of arsenic, chromium, and manganese in almost all water sources within the vicinity of the plant. The following year, the Thai Provincial court awarded US$142,500 to the villagers for crop damages caused by the coal power plant.

Greenpeace believes that this compensation is the government's way of recognizing the plant's disastrous effect on people's lives.
On page 159 | During the time of the implementation of the Mae Moh coal power plant, thousands acquired severe respiratory problems due to the inhalation and exposure to sulfur dioxide emitted from the mine.

On page 160 | In its technical assistance completion report, the ADB admitted that the Mae Moh power station including the Mae Moh mine, has caused environmental and social problems, in particular, local air pollution causing public health problems.

This page | An aerial view of the devastation of the Mae Moh mines. Farmlands have been negatively affected by acid rain which is attributed to the sulfuric dioxide released by the coal power plant.
Calaca Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant Project

1984 & 1995
Coal ash from the power plant contains hazardous substances, such as heavy metals, and the people in the area are bombarded daily with this pollution.

The Calaca Power Station is pointing to signs of dangerous pollution level, according to Kalikasan-People’s Network for the Environment (Kalikasan-PNE).
Calaca Power Station is a 900-megawatt (MW) coal-fired power plant in Batangas, Philippines. Initially owned by the government, DMCI bought the plant in July 2009 for $361 million. The ADB provided a US$120 million loan to assist with the privatization and refurbishment of the Calaca power station.

In May 2016, SEM-Calaca began a restoration project on the original two 300-MW units of Calaca. The two units had degraded since construction and had an output of only 500 MW. The goal of the restoration was to bring them back up to 600 MW.

In January 2017 a protest organized by SAMBAT (Samahan ng mga Magbubukid ng Batangas) called on the DENR to shut down the Calaca coal-fire plant. Among the issues raised are displacement, illnesses caused by the power station such as lower respiratory tract infections, pneumonia, hypertension, and diarrhea, damaged livelihood such as decreased fish catch, while many others who depended on agriculture resorted to seasonal and odd jobs like a construction worker, household helper, and farmworker, and this has been going on for three decades.

In addition, the coal plant and mining projects are feared to cause massive environmental degradation as these are located close to the Verde Island Passage, which is known as the world’s center of marine biodiversity.

Calaca power station also has not fulfilled its intended purpose of lowering the country’s electricity cost. Even communities surrounding it have not benefited from the presence of the power plant.

A proposed expansion to increase the plant’s capacity by an additional 700 MW was proposed but was cancelled in November 2020.
Industrial Tree Plantation Project

*** Photos courtesy of Chris Lang
The Industrial Tree Plantation Project in Laos, funded by the ADB, is a US$ 10.44M loan that aims to provide opportunities to generate economic growth and development through large-scale industrial tree plantations.

The ADB claims to be planting only on “degraded” land and forest, but in reality, the Bank is funding the replacement of villagers’ community forests, swidden fields, grazing land, and commons with monoculture eucalyptus plantations.

In 2001, independent researchers reported that at Ban Nao Neua, in Xaibouli district, 100 hectares of dry dipterocarp forest were destroyed to make way for ADB-funded eucalyptus plantations. Instead of addressing villagers’ concerns about the plantations, ADB’s consultants attempted to convince villagers that the plantations would not cause any problems and that a further 100 hectares should be planted.

In Ban Lao Kha and Ban Lao Luang in Khammouane province, areas of dense natural forest have been cleared to establish ADB-funded plantations. Villagers in Ban Lao Luang report that they have to walk further to collect mushrooms and that wildlife and birds have moved to the remaining forest areas.

Aside from environmental and livelihood projects, the ADB has also declined to issue a list of the documents prepared under phase 1 of its tree plantations project in Laos. Without a list of documents, it is impossible to know whether the ADB conforms to its information disclosure policy.

According to the ADB’s project description, phase 2 of its plantations project in Laos “will build on the successes and lessons learned from the ongoing Industrial Tree Plantation Project.” However, the Bank has declined to disclose what it believes to be the successes or lessons learned from its previous project.
Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project

LAOS

1994
The Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project, funded by the ADB, and constructed in 1998, has impacted 29,000 people in 71 villages. Most of them have lost their fisheries, rice fields, and vegetable gardens and have lost access to fresh drinking water.

The project has displaced 4,800 people, mostly indigenous people. It has relocated thousands of people living downstream along the Hai and Hinboun rivers.

In addition, there was no information or plans regarding the possible livelihood of relocated communities.

The project also diverts water from the Theun to the Hai and Hinboun Rivers causing severe erosion and flooding in river basins.

Many villagers living along the Hai and Hinboun Rivers have abandoned wet-season rice fields because the floods have made rice cultivation unviable.

The flooding has also caused water contamination, livestock deaths, and other hardships for villagers living downstream.
On page 175 | Soil eroding on the Hai and Hinboun river basins leading to loss of land and riverbank vegetable garden.

On page 177 | Communities in the area forced to relocate with no clear information of plans regarding possible livelihood of communities that were relocated.

This page | Reservoir area of Theun-Hinboun Expansion Project.
In November of 1995, the ADB approved a 150 million USD loan to support the Thai government’s Pollution Control Department (PCD) in establishing systems to manage wastewater being discharged by factories and residents in the Bangkok metropolitan area, including Samut Prakarn.

In the beginning, the plan was to build two separate treatment plants close to the main pollution sources where about 5,000 factories are located. However, by the time the ADB approved an additional loan of USD 80 M, the project site had been shifted some 20 kilometers away to Klong Dan, which is situated towards the eastern edge of Samut Prakarn Province. The new plan was to build a very centralized plant, one of the largest wastewater treatment plants in Southeast Asia, to process 525,000 cm³ a day of wastewater, including heavy metals and hazardous waste.

Klong Dan villagers came to know about the project after the construction had started. In late 1998, they saw a sign put up by a construction company,
a joint venture (JV), in front of the wastewater management facility. They were surprised to learn that a huge wastewater treatment plant was already under construction in their neighborhood. There was a total lack of information disclosure and meaningful participation by the local community.

Determined to try every measure to block the project, in April 2001, Klong Dan villagers proceeded to file an official grievance with ADB’s Inspection Mechanism (now developed into two separate offices: the Special Project Facilitator and Compliance Review Panel). Following its procedures, the Inspection Panel tried to visit Klong Dan for a field investigation in October 2001. However, the Thai government did not grant permission for the Panel’s site visit. Thus, the Panel had to complete its report in December 2001 without meeting Klong Dan residents but pointed out in its final report that ADB had violated several of its own policies and procedures. This was quite significant, given ADB’s previous negligence on the matter. The bad news though, was that the Panel still did not agree that the project should be canceled. They only recommended minor remedial changes, such as paying adequate compensation to affected villagers. What was worse was ADB’s management rejected the Panel’s conclusion and denied the policy violation. On March 25, 2002, the ADB’s Board of Directors discussed the Klong Dan case but also avoided making clear decisions on ADB’s policy violations.

After an unprecedented one year probe into the allegations, then ADB President Tadao Chino has called for a revamp of the bank’s inspection policy. The Bank had ordered a three-member independent panel of outside experts to probe the Thai project last year following written complaints by representatives of some 60,000 villagers impacted by the project. On page 181 | In 2000, the mayor and citizens of Klong Dan filed the first-ever complaint with the ADB over the impacts of the Samut Prakarn project. This page | Aerial view of the colossal Samut Prakarn Wastewater treatment facility.
Electricity Market and Transmission Development

This page | Consumers in mobilizing against the high electricity rates.
On page 187 | Forum member SENTRO organizing a mobilization against the passage of EPIRA in front of the ADB Headquarters.
According to its proponents, the Republic Act (RA) 9136, or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) of 2001, was supposed to be the answer to power and fiscal woes of the Philippines. But years after, the country now has the most expensive electricity in Asia. Price manipulation besets the industry. Rotating brownouts plague Mindanao. And the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) remains neck-deep in debt.

How the law was passed was controversial. There were claims of bribery involving half a billion pesos that the Arroyo administration allegedly handed out to members of the House of Representatives (HOR) to speed up the passage of EPIRA.

EPIRA provides the legal framework for the privatization of NAPOCOR and deregulation of the power industry. The state-owned power firm used to own and operate generation plants and transmission facilities. It also held supply contracts with independent power producers (IPPs) or private companies allowed by the Power Crisis Act of 1993 (RA 7648) and BOT Law of 1994 (RA 7718) to build and operate generation plants. Under EPIRA, the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corp. (PSALM) was set up to privatize the NAPOCOR’s generation and transmission assets, including its IPP contracts.

The passage of EPIRA was a conditionality set by the creditors of NAPOCOR for it to access additional loans. The ADB, World Bank, and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) were among its largest creditors. These creditors were worried that NAPOCOR, with its worsening financial problems, might not be able to pay them back. The pressure from these creditors provided the impetus for EPIRA’s enactment.

PSALM has already privatized 91.7 percent of NAPOCOR’s generation assets in the Luzon and Visayas grid. It has also privatized almost two-thirds of energy outputs under IPP contracts nationwide. The transmission was privatized via a 25-year Concession Agreement (CA) between the government and the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) in January 2009. As of October 2010, the remaining assets for privatization include three generating assets (1,740.10 megawatts) and eight IPP contracts (2,026.32 MW).

For consumers, the most apparent impact of EPIRA is the escalation in their monthly electricity bills. Rates have soared because EPIRA allowed the notorious purchased power adjustment (PPA) to continue collecting. The PPA was a pre-EPIRA cost recovery mechanism so that NAPOCOR could increase its rates and pay for its ballooning obligations arising from its take-or-pay contracts with the IPPs.

Consumers are also burdened by the Incremental Currency Exchange Rate Adjustment (ICERA). Thru the ICERA, hapless end-users of electricity shoulder the losses of companies arising from fluctuations in the foreign exchange.
The ADB has established itself as the leading funding agency in the Tonle Sap Basin. The Bank’s involvement in Tonle Sap Basin started in 1998 as part of technical assistance (TA) for the Mekong Region, amounting to US$1.65 million. It has the objective of identifying investment projects related to community-based natural resources management.

With the goal of pro-poor sustainable growth and equitable access to natural resources, the ADB launched the Tonle Sap initiative in 2002. The initiative had four significant projects:

1. Tonle Sap Environmental Management Project (TSEMP) with a total cost of US$19.4 million
2. Tonle Sap Sustainable Livelihoods Project (TSSLP), US$19.7 million
3. Lowland Stabilization Project, US$1 million
4. Watershed Management Project, which is still in the pipeline

Tonle Sap is part of the Bank’s Regional Cooperation Strategy and Program (RCSP) for the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). The GMS-RCSP aimed to facilitate growth and development in the region. However, there were projects under the GMS that hindered the attainment of the goals of the Tonle Sap Initiative. Specifically, the result of a hydropower infrastructure in the upstream Mekong River will eventually have significant adverse environmental and social impacts on the Tonle Sap Basin.

In addition, Tonle Sap Lake is a tributary of the Mekong River, and built infrastructures in the upstream Mekong River could modify flooding patterns. The disruption of the natural flooding could lead to the decline of fish supply due to the blocking of fish migration.

The ADB also came up with a Land Acquisition and Resettlement Framework (LARF) to safeguard communities against negative resettlement impacts caused by infrastructure projects. However, there had been specific provisions that were ambiguous. The ADB conducted consultations only on some of its projects to a minimal extent. The majority of the villagers had little knowledge about the Bank’s projects.

Lastly, with the present hierarchical and political setup in the communities, there is a significant risk that women will not be heard or included during discussions.
This page | 4,200 villagers were involuntarily resettled for the dam’s reservoir.

On page 196 | Fishery and riverbank agriculture carried out by hundreds of thousands of people living along the Xe Bang Fai River have been negatively affected as the River is inundated by the discharge from Nam Theun 2.

On page 199 | Woman in Sop Ma resettlement village in the Nakai Plateau is planting rice and corn in NTPC’s allocated 0.66ha of land.
Nam Theun 2 Dam, funded by the ADB, is the biggest public project in Laos, with a total project cost of approximately US$1.45 billion, almost equivalent to one-quarter of the country’s Gross Domestic Product.

The dam is 48 meters high, and 450 square kilometers of the Nakai Plateau’s wetlands were submerged to make way for the dam’s reservoir. The project can generate 1,070 megawatts of electricity, 995 megawatts sold to Thailand, with the rest consumed domestically.

The project aims to reduce Laos PDR’s poverty with revenues obtained from electricity sales; however, fishery and riverbank agriculture carried out by hundreds of thousands of people living along the Xe Bang Fai River have been negatively affected as the river is inundated by the discharge from Nam Theun 2.

6,200 villagers were involuntarily resettled for the dam’s reservoir.
Resettlement in the Nakai Plateau was completed in April 2008. Villagers were supposed to be compensated for lost paddy fields and gardens before resettlement. However, compensation processes did not start until around October this year. Asset measurement to determine the amount of compensation entitled to affected families was conducted in 1998, but it was inaccurate because there was no uniform standard to evaluate villagers’ assets. Relocated families have now been complaining about decisions made on what to be compensated for and how compensation is calculated.

They may lodge an objection against results of asset measurement and request reinvestigation, but it will be extremely difficult to verify the accuracy of measurement, as their assets have been under the water for two years since the reservoir was filled.

Some residents have suffered damage from flooding in paddy fields this year in villages along the Xe Bang Fai River where water is discharged from Nam Theun 2. Low rice harvest has usually been covered by fishing in the river in the past, but the function of fishing activities as a conventional social safety net is gradually deteriorating as the dam’s discharge damages local fishery. The Nam Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC) offers affected communities a microcredit program through the village restoration fund in order to compensate for the loss of fishery. However, far from restoring their livelihood, some households have become impoverished with debt as a result of failed business because they were not given adequate technical support and/or sufficient advice on business risk.

The ADB and co-funder World Bank are backing up the Lao PDR government, trying to promote “poverty reduction through dams” while using the Nam Theun 2 project as a model. However, if such a model is replicated without solving, among others, the problem of long-term livelihood restoration facing the project, “poverty reduction” promised by the model will only continue to create new poverty.
The Reconstruction of Cement Production Facility in Aceh Project, funded by the ADB, is a reconstruction of the Lafarge SAI factory, including the expansion of the plant, construction of a coal-fired power plant, and a harbor facility. The loan was approved under questionable conditions, including the violation of ADB environmental and social safeguard requirements, inaccurate Environmental Impact Assessment, non-compliance with Indonesian laws regarding public information disclosure, and people’s participation in the EIA process, without proper public consultation.

In December 2007, more than 3,000 people from Lhok Nga and Leupung communities staged a demonstration in front of Lafarge SAI facilities demanding a revision of the EIA and stressing that local communities have the rights to be involved in the decision making regarding development in their area.

During the course of the project, Lafarge claimed that there are no people living in the area but in fact there are houses in the vicinity of the factory. More than 90 households live in the area of the factory and close to the quarry mine.
A conveyor belt was constructed to transport cement in bags from the factory to the port.

On page 203 | The Lafarge SAI factory that will be reconstructed.
More than two years after becoming aware of the resettlement program’s failure, the ADB funded Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City Highway Project finally set out to conduct the a project audit.

The Bank admitted the problems with the resettlement for the entire project area and agreed with the Cambodian government in May 2005 that the government should repay eligible families. The repayment was subsequently made in 2006. However, more than 300 families complained that they had not been adequately compensated.

July 2007, 63 families in the Kraing Kaok and Steung Slot Communities living in Prey Veng Province have filed a grievance letter at the ADB’s OSPF. Most of these families were re-compensated in 2006. However, they claimed that they still could not restore their life and livelihood mainly due to the considerable delay in the compensation.
The families requested the ADB to help them improve their livelihood and solve their debt problems and that the Bank should provide them with a land title for a resettled land.

OSPF met two community leaders in Cambodia and declared the case eligible on 19 September 2007. The two communities are expected to speak directly with OSPF to review and assess their complaints.

However, the OSPF never returned to Cambodia, stating that the Cambodian government did not agree to their visit to the project site to conduct further investigation.
In 2006, six years after the relocation, many households finally received compensation for their lost lands and structures. But according to reports, as of April 2007, many villagers are still facing problems, such as not being able to obtain the land title for the security of tenure, raise funds to restore their livelihoods, and earn enough money to pay back high-interest loan resulting from delays in compensation payment.
GMS Rehabilitation of the Railway in Cambodia
On page 211 | A mother and her family desperately making ends meet in a resettlement site in Poipet province.

This page | In Battambang province, a relocation site approximately 293.9 km far northwest of Phnom Penh, residents go about every day with unclean drinking water which they get from the rain using a catch basin that ADB had made for them. In 2010, in the same catch basin, 2 children died while fetching water for their families, just four days after they moved to the resettlement site.

On page 214 | A resident of Trapaing Anhchanh, a resettlement site 5 to 6 hours away from Phnom Penh stated angrily that ADB and its fellow funders, as well as the Cambodian Government, lied to them by saying that the relocation site would be better than their current place and that they will be given a compensation package that will help them get back on their feet as soon as they move to the designated relocation site.

The Cambodian government initiated its Rehabilitation of the Railway project in 2007 in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and AusAID. Its aim was to restore the country’s railway infrastructure by rehabilitating the existing track and re-establishing Cambodia’s rail connection with Thailand.

The project received significant criticism for its management, timelines, and negative impact on families in the affected areas. By 2014, only the southern line between Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville was operational, while the longer northern line, linking Phnom Penh to Poipet and the Thai border, had run out of funds with a large part of the work still unfinished.

There had also been a collateral burden on the population, who had suffered loss of property, livelihood and income: “Some 3,000 families living along the tracks have lost parts of their land to make way for the project, and another 1,000 have had to move to ill-equipped resettlement camps”. While some families benefited from the relocation, most appear to have been left worse off. There was no appropriate consultation process for the resettlement of local communities. The ADB’s Compliance Review Panel (CRP) “found major design flaws in the original 2006 resettlement plan. These included inadequate requirements for consultation with and participation by affected households, a lack of provisions for inflation-indexed compensation, no provisions for replacement housing of minimum standard to improve the situation of poor and vulnerable resettled families.”

Some families have been left unable to reconstruct adequate housing that meets minimum standards under international law, which amounts to a serious violation of human rights. None of the five Project-sponsored resettlement sites were fully prepared with basic services and facilities when resettlement commenced, causing considerable hardship to resettled families. There is also lack of access to safe, sufficient and affordable water has been a particular concern.

Resettlement sites are located far away from people's original homes and places of business, with minimal opportunities to generate new income. Despite the known risk of income reduction or joblessness upon resettlement, effective income restoration programs have not been implemented many months after resettlement.
Morn Marin, an 85-year-old man with poor health condition, living in Trapaing Anhchanh. The area has impossible access to health centers or hospital.

Students of kilometer 2 suffering from air pollution brought about by the garbage site near the relocation site in Poipet.
The East–West Economic corridor funded by the ADB is an economic development program initiated in order to promote development and integration of four Southeast Asian countries, namely: Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam.

The East–West Economic Corridor, while promises to promote economic development along the route, adversely affected critical ecosystems and areas valued for their high biodiversity by fragmenting habitat. Over the long-term, environmental degradation, if not addressed, undermine the region’s environmental security and long-term socioeconomic development.

The project was funded via the Asian Development Fund for US$ 32.00 M from 18 May 1999 to 14 Dec 2006.
Construction of the East-West Economic corridor funded by the ADB

The bridge over the Mekong River connects Northeast Thailand and Southern Laos.

The East-West Economic Corridor, while it promises to promote economic development along the route, will also adversely affect critical ecosystems and areas valued for their high biodiversity by fragmenting habitat.
Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program

INDONESIA

2008
Citarum is one of the longest rivers in Java, measuring over 11,000 sq km and about 270 km long.

There are more than nine million people living in the Citarum River basin. Due to high population density and operation of industries along the river basin, Citarum has been severely polluted. There are over 200 industries operating along Citarum that has been dumping 270 tons of industrial waste per day into the river.

Sedimentation has also become a problem which has been causing flooding in the downstream area. The river retains capacity has also been decreasing. Labeled as the dirtiest river by the ADB, the Bank approved a $500-million loan to the government of Indonesia to rehabilitate the dying Citarum River. This is under the multi-tranche financing facility (MFF), the Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (ICWRMP), a 15-year program, implemented in four tranches.

However, civil society organizations have challenged the ADB-funded ICWRMP due to lack of disclosure of information to local communities that will be directly affected by the project. In addition, the local implementing agency has evicted people living along the West Tarum Canal even before the finalization of the resettlement plans for the project.

In December 2009, a complaint was filed in the Office of the Special Project Facilitator of the ADB for the eviction of a number of households. The complaint was deemed ineligible, but local groups have continued to monitor and engage with the Bank regarding the project.

On page 225 | 85% of the river water goes to irrigation. The rest is used for domestic and industrial purposes.

This page | Due to high volume of population living near Citarum river, it has been severely polluted.
The Masinloc Thermal Power Project (MTTP) in Zambales, Philippines, started its operation in 1998.

The two-unit plant uses imported high-quality bituminous coal, which produces 385,000 tons of ash per year and releases massive amounts of carbon dioxide that is toxic to human health and the environment.

The US$441-million project was jointly financed by the ADB, Export-Import Bank of Japan, and the local executing agency, National Power Corporation (NPC). The Japanese Bank reportedly required that NPC attain “100 percent social acceptability” before it agreed to fund the project. The ADB, meanwhile, provided risk insurance.

In 2002, the Bank’s Operations Evaluation Mission (OEM) report rated the project “successful,” saying that MTTP was relevant, highly efficacious, efficient, and sustainable. It also found the design and equipment in conformance with environmental standards while the operation and maintenance were deemed satisfactory. The OEM said the project had had moderate socioeconomic and ecological impacts.

This was in direct contrast to a 2002 report by Greenpeace, which revealed that fly ash samples taken from the Masinloc Coal Power Plant and two other coal-powered plants were contaminated with a range of toxic and potentially toxic elements, including arsenic, chromium, lead, and mercury.

In addition, ash samples taken from Philippine coal-fired power plants revealed the presence of mercury—a deadly neurotoxin, arsenic—a known carcinogen, as well as the hazardous substances lead and chromium. Communities in the area have been exposed to health risks. This report runs counter to the Bank’s pronouncements that the environmental impacts of MTTP are well within limits set by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The project directly affected 198 families or around 1,000 individuals in Barangay Bani. It has also impacted communities that use the Lawis River (where the plant gets water for cooling). The warm water from the cooling device goes directly into Oyon Bay, resulting in the bleaching of coral reefs surrounding the coal plant.

Although NPC employed many residents from Barangay Bani during the MTTP construction, promises of employment were unfulfilled when it started operations. Those who applied were deemed unqualified.
The Song Bung 4 dam, funded by the ADB project, is to be built on the Bung River, a tributary of the Giang River, a tributary of the Vu Gia River in Nam Giang district, Quang Nam province, in Central Vietnam. The project consists of a dam, reservoir, and a 156 MW hydropower plant amounting to USD 254 million. The dam will create a reservoir with a 621 million cubic meters storage capacity and a surface area of 18.4 square kilometers (km²). The project started in 2008 and will be completed in October 2022.

Once the dam is complete, the villager’s land will be submerged by the reservoir, including their houses and farmland. The project is expected to uproot more than 200 families, mainly the Ka Tu ethnic minority group, from four villages along Bung River in Zouil commune, consisting of Pa Rum A, Pa Rum B, and Pa Dhi and Thon village. The project will affect the communities because the villagers will be moved to a new location that is physically unsafe for them, where they cannot easily find food, lack resources, and make their lives more difficult.

Local villagers are engaged in agriculture, and they depend most heavily on their homegrown food, farmland, and tools for building their houses. They use the water from the river, streams, and springs.
The Visayas Baseload Power Development Project is a 200 MW coal-fired power plant constructed in the City of Naga, Cebu. The coal-fired power plant project, which was supported by the Cebu Provincial Government and the Department of Energy (DOE) and was intended to boost base-load power supply to respond to the increasing power demand in Cebu, as well as other parts in the Visayas, based on DOE’s demand and supply forecast.

The $220M project is co-funded by the ADB and the Korean Export-Import Bank (KEXIM). However, the ADB and KSPC failed to conduct meaningful consultations with affected people to inform them about the project and ascertain its social acceptability. They also failed to disclose relevant project documents such as the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and preliminary project information during public scoping.

Community-based groups led by Freedom from Debt Coalition Cebu claimed that CFBC technology only reduces sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions, but not carbon dioxide—the leading contributor to climate change. And with the production of coal combustion waste per wattage by CFBC plants four times more than conventional coal-burning plants, coal ash disposal will be a significant concern.
The project has also been criticized as the coal ash dumpsite was not also included in the EIA. The assigned dumpsite is a submerged land fronting the sea, which will result in seepage/leakage of metallic elements such as arsenic, lead, and mercury which are identified harmful elements to both humans and marine life resources.

The project will also result in adverse impacts on the health of residents and nearby communities. The operation of the coal power plant is expected to lead to the proliferation of skin and respiratory illnesses based on historical data. Incidental spillage of coal by sea and land transport will expose residents and the environment to hazardous and toxic elements.

In 2011, together with FDC Cebu, impacted communities filed a case before the Office of the Special Project Facilitator (OSPF) but later on changed their minds because of the lack of confidence in the mediator assigned by OSPF.

In the same year, the same group filed a case before the Compliance Review Panel (CRP).
The series of projects **Promoting Economic Use of Customary Land**, the ADB has driven land and financial sector reforms in Samoa to make it easier to lease customary land and to use those leases as collateral for loans.

Under the reforms, the lease agreement could then be used by the leaseholder to access credit from a bank. But if the leaseholder is unable to repay the loan, the bank can take control of the lease, which could cover large tracts of customary land for decades.

The group of village matais (chiefs) who filed an official complaint to the bank on 29th of August 2014, objecting to a series of ADB-backed reforms that could lead to the alienation of customary lands in Samoa, have elevated their complaint to the Compliance Review Panel (CRP), the highest level of grievance mechanism in ADB. According to the chiefs, the problem solving process to date has failed to address their fundamental concerns as clearly articulated in their complaint.
On page 245 | A view of an island in Samoa during golden hour.
This page and page 248 | Impacted communities stated that the benefits of the project will flow not to local communities, but to foreign investors and national elites while members of aiga will face dispossession from potentially large-tracts of land, foreseeably resulting in loss of income, threats to food security and impoverishment.
Globally, solid waste management is an environmental problem that has reached critical proportions calling governments at all levels to take immediate action. Efforts have been taken to address the issue spanning from the promulgation of laws, local ordinances and designing specific programs for solid waste management. Waste-to-Energy ("WtE") technologies, in particular, have been drawing the attention of developing countries and the support of some financial institutions because of its promise to reduce waste and at the same time produce energy.

WtE facilities proposals to be funded by the ADB have already been identified in urban areas, specifically in Quezon City in the National Capital Region, Pangasinan in Luzon, Cebu City and Tacloban City in the Visayas, and in Davao City in Mindanao.

In Cebu City, New Sky Energy Philippines and ARN Central Waste Management, Inc. are currently negotiating with Cebu City for the proposal to develop a Waste-to-Energy facility. Based on available documents on the proposed WtE incineration project in Cebu City, not only will this project result to damaging effects in the environment, but it will also present a huge and heavy economic burden for the local government of Cebu City, which is required under the proposed Joint Venture Agreement with New Sky Energy (Philippines) to guarantee a minimum feedstock of 600 metric tons per day for the next 30 years to keep the burning of garbage viable.
On page 251 | Residents from Brgy. Inayawan protesting against incineration in their communities.

On page 252 | Environment and climate activists and informal waste pickers in Cebu, Philippines affiliated under Sanlakas, No Burn Filipinas, and EcoWaste Coalition staged a symbolic wreath laying protest action in the controversial and foreclosed Barangay Inayawan Sanitary Landfill to demand the withdrawal of ADB on all WTE incinerator projects in the city.

This page | The symbolic wreath used during the Day of Action stating that WTE is more harmful option than coal.
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